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ENTERPRISE ENVIRONMENT AND EQUITY IN THE VIRUNGA LANDSCAPE OF THE GREAT LAKES

TRANSBOUNDARY NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE GREATER VIRUNGA

**LESSONS LEARNED FROM REGIONAL APPROACHES TO
CONSERVATION FACILITATED BY THE INTERNATIONAL
GORILLA CONSERVATION PROGRAMME**

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I. Introduction: IGCP's Lessons Learned initiative

The International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP) was founded in 1991 as a partnership between the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), Fauna & Flora International (FFI) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). IGCP was established as a regional programme working in the Virunga and Bwindi afro-montane forest habitats that straddle the borders of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda. The goal of IGCP is to ensure the conservation of mountain gorillas and their forest habitat and this is pursued through three principle strategies:-

- › Establishing a strong information base, including support for ranger-based monitoring;
- › Strengthening regional collaboration between DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, including support for Transboundary Natural Resource Management (TBNRM); and
- › Supporting the livelihoods of people living around the parks.

IGCP approaches these strategies through partnerships, first and foremost with the three national protected area authorities, but also with international NGOs, local authorities, community based organisations and private businesses in the region.

Despite the evident difficulties of operating in this war-torn region, conservation efforts have led to tangible successes, most notably an increase in the number of mountain gorillas. The Lessons Learned initiative is intended to analyse and document the work of IGCP to understand how it has contributed to this success through a range of interventions that are aligned with the strategies outlined above. The Lessons Learned reports are intended to articulate the experiences, successes and weaknesses of a long-term conservation programme and to share this learning with the wider conservation community. The Lessons Learned initiative will involve a series of analytical studies, each concentrating on a key theme of IGCP's work. The first two themes have now been completed. One of these looked at **Capacity Building**, which has been critical to IGCP's mission to work with and support the protected area authorities of DRC, Rwanda and Uganda. In DRC and Rwanda in particular, this has required significant work to build the skills, resources and procedures of *Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature* (ICCN) and *Office Rwandais du Tourisme et des Parcs Nationaux* (ORTPN) respectively. The other completed study focused on **Community Conservation** which has risen up IGCP's agenda over the years, reflecting a growing awareness of the close association between conservation and local livelihoods. As with many areas of IGCP's work, community conservation has involved considerable innovation, most notably in the development and testing of a 'conservation enterprise' model that involves partnering private businesses to develop sustainable, conservation oriented businesses. In addition to these two analytical studies, there is also a paper that summarises IGCP's **Achievements** since 1991.

Over the next couple of years, it is intended that resources will be available for further studies of other key areas of IGCP's work. One planned topic is **Tourism**. IGCP, and its predecessor the Mountain Gorilla Project, developed gorilla tourism and continue to play a central role in this industry, supporting the PAAs in developing sustainable practices and working to develop community-based campsites and lodges, as well as associated enterprises such as crafts. Another topic is **Ranger Based Monitoring**, an information system developed by IGCP in DRC and introduced into Rwanda and Uganda, enabling consistent information throughout the region and a strong basis for identifying threats and designing well targeted interventions. Another topic is **Human-Wildlife Conflict Resolution** which IGCP has addressed on a number of fronts, including the construction of a buffalo wall around the Virunga massif, the formation of community based associations for managing problem animals (HUGO in Uganda and ANICO in Rwanda), and recent experimentation with resilient land-uses in the Nkuringo buffer zone in Uganda. Cutting across most of these topics is the experience that IGCP has gained with operating conservation interventions in a conflict zone, an experience which sadly remains highly relevant in DRC.

The current study focuses on one of the overriding strategies of IGCP: a regional approach based on transboundary collaboration. Whilst transboundary natural resource management (TBNRM) is now widespread, IGCP's experience has some unusual aspects that make an original contribution to conservation learning. Firstly, the cooperation between the three nations has been developed and sustained during an era of very poor international relations including various times when partner countries have been fighting each other. Even as we were conducting this study, diplomatic relations between DRC and Rwanda had been broken off, yet the Greater Virunga Transboundary Core Secretariat still managed to meet on December 1st 2008. The second unusual aspect is that TBNRM in the Virunga region has developed from informal field level cooperation and only relatively recently moved up to ministerial level and formal agreements.

2. Background to TBNRM

Transboundary Natural Resource Management (TBNRM) is a process for promoting cooperative management of resources that cut across national borders or which are affected by activities across borders. The promotion of TBNRM sometimes involves the removal of physical partitions such as fences and always involves the removal of institutional barriers to cooperative behaviour. Some institutional changes, such as joint committees, are typically directed towards improving personal relations between international partners whilst others, such as revenue sharing, are geared towards structuring the economic environment in ways that render cooperation more rational and advantageous than competition. At the most fundamental level, TBNRM is about creating a scale of governance that is appropriate for agreed management objectives whilst also being politically workable.

Since the early 1990s it has become common to associate transboundary management of African protected areas with attempts to establish and maintain peace:

Parks for peace are transboundary protected areas that are formally dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and to the promotion of peace and cooperation (Sandwith et al., 2001, p.3).

Not all transboundary protected areas are peace parks. In addition to ecological objectives, peace parks usually aim to strengthen international friendships as well as regional sustainable economic development. The current name given to TBNRM in the Virungas (and the wider region) is the Central Albertine Rift Transboundary Protected Area Network. Whilst this name does not make either peace or economic development objectives explicit, we will see below that these objectives are prominent in the international agreements that have been drafted to date.

2.1. *History of Transboundary Protected Areas*

The first use of the term 'peace park' is widely attributed to the merger of the Glacier National Park in the US with Waterton Lakes National Park in Canada in 1932, forming the Waterton Lakes Glacier International Peace Park. It was not until much more recently that the idea has been employed in a region experiencing armed conflict, which was the 1998 peace agreement between Ecuador and Peru in the Cordillera del Condor border region (Ali, 2007). The number of Transboundary Protected Areas has grown fairly quickly, from 59 TBPA's in 1988 to 188 in 2005 (Ali, 2007).

The Albert National Park, established by the Belgians in 1925, was the first African park to cross international borders, between the then Ruanda-Urundi and Congo. Van der Linde et al. (2001) suggests that the first post-colonial African transboundary park was Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, established between South Africa and Botswana in April 1999. Two years previous to that, the Peace Parks Foundation was formed in South Africa, funded by the businessman, Anton Rupert. In a conference held that year, participants endorsed proposals to establish peace parks in a number of regions, with the mountain gorilla habitats being one of the targets (Wilkie et al., 2001). According to Amerom and Buscher (2005) and Hughes (2003), South African politicians have been strong backers of the peace park idea, partly because it fits with larger political agendas linked to an 'African Renaissance'. This agenda of African solutions for African problems arose in post-apartheid South Africa, and is embodied in a new generation of African statesmen such as Kagame in Rwanda and Museveni in Uganda. Nelson Mandela himself endorsed the peace parks movement:

I know of no political movement, no philosophy, no ideology, which does not agree with the peace parks concept as we see it going into fruition today. It is a concept that can be embraced by all. In a world beset by conflict and division, peace is one of the cornerstones of the future. Peace parks are a building block in this process, not only in our region but potentially in the entire world. (cited in Amerom and Buscher, 2005, p.168).

2.2. *Rationale for Transboundary Protected Areas*

As Mandela's statement indicates, the idea of transboundary parks appeals across a range of actors. African politicians can rally around the idea of African solutions, sitting alongside regional economic cooperation; conservationists can see efficiencies arising from scale and harmonisation of protection efforts; businesses can see opportunities for expanded tourism; local governments and NGOs can see prospects for community based approaches and benefit sharing. In this section we review the

potential benefits of TBPA, as perceived by some of these stakeholders. Whilst the broad appeal of TBPA is helpful for building coalitions, IGCP and others also need to recognise the potential problems that arise from agendas that are only superficially the same. The fact that different stakeholders support TBNRM for different reasons, and that these reasons are often built on naïve assumptions about what TBNRM can realistically deliver, is a potential source of tensions that requires managing.

2.2.1. Ecological rationale

The ecological case for transboundary management rests not with the need for inter-agency cooperation, but with the need for larger scales of management, and the need for conservation to go beyond the boundaries of existing protected areas. The need to operate at the scale of 'landscape' is necessary where landscape level ecological structures are expected to have a significant effect on variables such as species abundance and distribution (Fahrig, 2005). Where this is the case, success in conservation will require a shift from managing single species to entire ecosystems and from managing just parks to managing the land around and between parks, i.e. the whole landscape rather than fragments of it (With, 2005). Many protected areas are not solely large enough to preserve biodiversity over long time periods, with particular difficulties maintaining viable populations in the face of inevitable disturbances. We know that species can go extinct even when they exist within PAs (Wilkie et al., 2008), and we know that PAs are often too small to maintain evolutionary and ecological processes (Danby and Scott Slocombe, 2005).

Advances in radiotelemetry in the 1960s (Rolstad, 2005) and spatial analysis technologies in the 1980s (especially Geographical Information Systems) enhanced the potential for conservation managers to understand how species interact with landscapes. In the Albertine Rift, for example, there is now a better understanding of how species such as elephants move around within landscapes (Plumptre *et al* 2007, 2008) and there are plans to extend this understanding by, for example, tagging lions.

“For us, the landscape approach is based on the identification of threats and targets. First we identify the target, then the threats, and finally we work on mitigation strategies. Some conservation targets may be local, but threats are often external and operate on a wider scale, and so too must our efforts to reduce those threats.” Eugene Rutagarama, IGCP Director

The main ecological arguments for TBNRM are:

- › Larger contiguous areas reduce the impact of disturbance on ecological communities, reducing the risk of extinction.
- › Larger contiguous areas help to maintain viable populations, especially of large carnivores.
- › Ease of control of pests and alien invasives.
- › Ease of control of poaching and illegal trades.
- › Facilitation of adaptation to climate change, especially where species may be forced to migrate away from protected areas.
- › Maintaining ecological processes and functions (though this is mainly a benefit where previously there were physical barriers to movement across borders).

2.2.2. Peace Building Rationale

There is an unfortunate geographical association between tropical forests and violent conflicts, including many conflicts in the vicinity of African rainforests such as in Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire. Forests provide cover for rebel armies as well as lootable resources that can sustain armed conflicts. Their adjacent lands also harbour some of the world's poorest people, providing opportunities for recruitment of soldiers, including children. José Kalpers (2001) notes that the Virunga massif is not only a magnet for military forces operating in the region, but also a refuge for civilians seeking escape.

Whilst conflict is often disastrous for conservation, post-conflict situations can be equally bad (McNeeley, 2003), with difficulties in natural resource management arising from: low capacity in state authorities, the removal of infrastructure constraints to resource extraction, the demand for land for returnees, the need to exploit resources to repay war debts, the need to bestow patronage on allies, the growth of the informal 'war economy', deepened dependence of local livelihoods on natural resources, slow recovery of civil society and insufficient power for local people to represent their

interests through democratic channels. Perhaps of even greater concern is the danger of a vicious spiral in which such weak post-conflict governance provides conditions that favour renewed conflict, such as deepening poverty and inequality. The post-war resource economy can be disastrous for the poor and can undermine long-term peace-building efforts, by exacerbating some of the very insecurities that fuelled social hostilities in the first place. According to some research, the window of opportunity for getting resource management right is fairly narrow, not only for sustainability but also for forestalling the likelihood of further grievance. Collier et al. (2003) found that 44% of countries having a violent conflict are back at war within 5 years of a cease-fire, whilst the World Bank found that 50% return to violence within a decade due to misappropriation of funds from natural resources.

Transboundary Protected Areas are seen by some stakeholders as a vehicle for breaking out from vicious cycles of environmental conflict and working for a more virtuous circle of environmental peacemaking. The main arguments for believing TBPA's capable of delivering such outcomes are that cooperative and effective natural resource management can help to support: the revenue base for strengthening the state; investment in development infrastructure and social provision; a focus for rebuilding civil society; and environmental peacemaking through addressing social inequality (Conca, 2002).

2.2.3. Economic Development Rationale

The third common rationale and objective for TBNRM is economic development, with opportunities arising out of the intended benefits of scaling up, the intended peace dividend and, more generally from cooperation across national borders. Placing an emphasis on economic development is a reflection of government and private sector priorities. However, it is also a rationale that is supported by a landscape perspective on conservation, in which conservation is understood to be dependent not only on protected areas but on the human settlements in which they are situated. For some stakeholders, economic development tends to be an end in itself; for others it tends to be more a means towards a conservation end, based on the assumption that economic development is a necessary condition for conservation oriented behaviour.

In relation to transboundary parks, economic benefits can arise from nature based tourism through the packaging of multiple sites and from easier movement between attractions. For example, one of the attractions to the private sector of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park was the possibility to market a 'Kruger plus' tourism package (Wolmer, 2003), whilst in the Albertine Rift, there is potential to package the combined attractions of the Semliki Game Reserve, Rwenzori Mountains and Virunga National Park (Sandwith et al., 2001). The emphasis on tourism, especially in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, has led to some concern about the motives and beneficiaries of TBNRM. Amerom and Busher (2005), Hughes (2003) and Wolmer (2003) all point to an explicit neoliberal ideology underpinning the peace parks movement, illustrated by a progressive commoditization of nature and commercialization of conservation. In Southern African TBPA's, the benefits of such commercialization have not always lived up to expectations, mainly because private sector investment has remained relatively low and growth in tourism has been modest (Amerom and Busher, 2005). Set against the possible commercial gains from expanding conservation frontiers, it is important to consider the possible threats to local communities – 'transboundary' is typically applied to animals and governance arrangements, whilst for local people boundaries become less permeable leading to reduced livelihood options (Kayitare, 2005). The Southern African experience suggests that IGCP and partners need to recognize that the interests of stakeholders who benefit from tourism are not always aligned with the interests of other stakeholders and also that the promise of tourism expansion has sometimes exceeded the reality.

2.3. Theorising TBNRM

A basic ambition of TBNRM is to transform the relationship between transnational actors from competition/conflict to cooperation. Such a transformation is often presented as movement along a linear spectrum, with conflict at one end and cooperation at the other. For example, Sandwith et al (2001) identify six 'levels of cooperation':

- › no cooperation
- › communication
- › consultation
- › collaboration
- › coordination of planning

› full cooperation

More recently, researchers studying transboundary water management have observed that 'it is possible for states to engage in modes of high cooperation and high conflict at the same time' (Mirumachi, 2007, p.4). This re-conceptualisation of the relationship between cooperation and conflict would seem highly pertinent for TBNRM in the Central Albertine Rift. Thinking historically, we might even propose that over time, border parks such as those of the Virunga massif have become arenas for increasingly securitised and even violent conflicts between states, *at the same time* as becoming arenas for progressively intense cooperation over park management. This is not to say that there is a positive relationship between conflict and cooperation but only to state that conflict and cooperation are not mutually exclusive and that it is an oversimplification to map them at different ends of a spectrum.

Lejano (2006) describes two models of cooperation that can explain the behaviour of actors in transboundary parks. The first model he describes as a 'game-theoretic lens' which essentially boils down to rational self interest. From this perspective, stakeholders will move towards cooperation because the economic and other institutions become restructured in ways that make cooperation the best choice of action for all parties. Such restructuring can be achieved, for example, through revenue sharing agreements that ensure that both sides of a border will benefit from growth in total park revenue – 'an emergent property of the system becomes a plus-plus outcome achieved in the context of a benefit sharing framework' (Heyns et al., 2008, p. 381). This contrasts with a situation where there is no regime of cooperation, where the rational way to respond to others is through uncoordinated independent choice – or in other words, the Nash Solution (Dombrowsky, 2008). Suppose there are a thousand people living around a forest and they don't communicate and they don't have enforced rules. From their isolated, individual perspectives, it is in their interest to take advantage of the resource by cutting trees – they receive all the benefit from the effort of cutting down a tree and if they don't do it, others surely will. On the other hand it makes no sense for them to plant trees – because the benefit arising from their effort will be enjoyed – a long time in the future - by 999 other people. So the individually rational behaviour is to cut trees but not replant. Collectively, such 'rational' behaviour is of course disastrous - it is a 'Nash Solution' best known in conservation circles as the 'tragedy of the commons'. Governance interventions, including rules about benefit sharing, can change the 'rules of the game', adjusting the economic structure of the situation in ways that favour behaviour that is collectively rational.

The alternative to emphasising economic rationality as the explanation for behaviour is to emphasise human relationships (Lejano, 2006). Building relationships between conservation partners entails going beyond developing mutual interests to developing mutual identities, which can be built around shared symbols such as the park or charismatic species such as the mountain gorilla. Activities implemented jointly, such as ranger patrols and gorilla censuses, enable participants on both sides of the border to see themselves as a group, with a collective identity. In a 2003 study of 136 transboundary park complexes, Zbicz found the presence of interpersonal contacts to be the strongest determinant of active cooperation (Lejano, 2006). Viewing cooperation through the lens of interpersonal relationships, with the strength of TB institutions linked to the breadth and depth of these relationships, enables a better understanding of the importance of the past. With rational choice analysis, the past is largely irrelevant as current choices are based on expectations of future benefits. With an emphasis on relationships, the past is very important, because features of strong relationships, such as trust, build from past experience.

3. TBNRM in the Central Albertine Rift

3.1. *The security context*

The Berlin treaty signed towards the end of the nineteenth century dividing Africa amongst western powers left people from the same ascendance in different countries. The territory of the former Rwandan kingdom was for example divided and some portions of it were allocated to the Congo (Rutshuru in particular) and to Uganda (mainly Bufumbira). During the 1940s, the Belgian colonial authorities moved large numbers of Rwandans across the border into Eastern Zaire. Whilst the two groups gained Congolese citizenship, they also retained cultural links to Rwanda, including the language of Kinyarwanda. From the 1950s, successive ethnic violence in Rwanda led to the exodus of ethnic Tutsis to neighbouring countries and further afield (Lanjouw *et al.*, 2004). Ethnic tension, and especially the relationship between Tutsis and other ethnic groups, has been a major factor in much recent conflict in the region. In Uganda, political and economic chaos under Obote included the persecution of Tutsis and other Rwandan immigrants, including a forced exodus into Rwanda in 1982.

In Rwanda, successive violence had driven more than a million Tutsis into exile by 1990, including many in Burundi, Uganda and Congo. The situation of the Rwandan ascendants in Uganda changed following Yoweri Museveni's overthrow of Obote in 1986. Some of them such as Paul Kagame and Fred Rwigyema occupied high positions in the Ugandan army and in 1987 the Rwandan Patriotic Front was formed with the ambition to repatriate the Rwandan stateless people. The RPF's initial attempt to invade Rwanda in 1990 through the Akagera National Park was repelled by the Rwandan army, with support from Congo and France, but fresh invasions began in 1991, this time using the Volcanoes National Park as an entry point. By this time Rwanda was in economic decline and politically unstable, with the former governmental leaders employing increasingly desperate tactics to stay in power. The 1994 Rwandan genocide involved the massacre of up to million people, mainly Tutsis but also moderate Hutus and members of the indigenous Twa people. As the RPF took control, the defeated Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) and Interahamwe fled alongside other Hutus, with an estimated 1.2 million crossing into Congo alone.

The former army (ex-FAR) and the Interahamwe re-organised within refugee camps, fuelling further cycles of violence, with attacks on Rwanda and on Congolese Tutsis including Banyamulenge which were met with retribution from the RPF (Turner, 2007). In 1996, president Mobutu's forces were under attack from a rebel movement led by Laurent Kabila, supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Angola. In an attempt to gain support in the east, Mobutu, who had been supported by Habyarimana, had made himself an enemy of the Banyamulenge by threatening to remove their citizenship, and by failing to tackle the Interahamwe (Moyroud and Katunga, 2002). The decline of Mobutu was accelerated by RPF forces pushing into Congo, putting an end to the border camps, and pursuing the Interahamwe westwards. With little resistance, Kabila took power in May 1997, with Mobutu fleeing to Switzerland.

The improved relationship between Rwanda and Congo was short lived, with Kagame frustrated by Kabila's failure to deal with the Hutu militias. By August 1998 Congo was once again in the grips of war, with fighting between Kabila and rebel groups, and the threat of escalation to a regional war. In the East, rebel armies were supported by an alliance of Rwanda and Uganda, whilst Kabila was backed by Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Chad (Moyroud and Katunga, 2002). Rwanda and Uganda were ostensibly interested in their own security, supporting rebels as a buffer against the still active Interahamwe. The alliance between Rwanda and Uganda has not held, with at times fighting over control of territory and resources within DRC.

The tensions in the area remain depressingly similar. Following Laurent Kabila's assassination in 2001 and some initial hopes of peace under his son Joseph, war has continued in Eastern DRC. The proximate causes of violence in this border area have yet to be removed – notably the presence of various armed rebel militias. Of particular concern for cross border relations is the continued presence of the Hutu rebel army, the FDLR, and the Tutsi rebel army, the CNDP. This is widely believed to be a fight in which DRC has backed the FDLR and Rwanda the CNDP. The current collaboration between the two national armies, with joint mission against the FDLR, is therefore of significant symbolic importance.

3.2. The early years of informal collaboration

Early attempts to develop bilateral and trilateral cooperation over park management failed to gain traction. For example, a tripartite meeting for Regional Development of Tourism met in Kigali in 1973 to develop a regional action plan, but failed to deliver action (d'Huart, 1989). IGCP's predecessor, the Mountain Gorilla Project, was formed in 1979 with a mandate to work in Rwanda only. The need to operate across national borders arose from the MGP's own experience of the realities of mountain gorilla conservation, but also from a growing awareness amongst other conservation agencies operating in the Albertine Rift. In the late 1980s, recognition of the importance of transboundary collaboration really began to take hold. In 1989, a regional forum for afro-montane forest ecosystems was formed and its first conference was held that year in Cyangugu, with follow ups in Bujumbura in 1992 and Mbarara in 1994 (Lanjouw *et al*, 2001, 2004). Also in the late 1980s, the EU was looking at ways of joining up its work in Eastern DRC and across the border in Uganda. The result was a recommended action plan that involved, amongst other things, the expansion of World Heritage Status across the border from PNVi into the Ugandan side of the ecosystem; the spread and harmonisation of gorilla tourism; harmonisation of management plans, and the establishment of a Regional Resources Management Committee (d'Huart, 1989).

As summarised above, war gripped the region in 1990, with the Ugandan-based RPF fighting for power in Rwanda. DRC was embroiled in its own problems, with economic and political crises leading to violent riots in September 1991, and the withdrawal of most donor agencies. Relations between DRC, Rwanda and Uganda were such that the borders were closed throughout the 1990-1994

Rwandan war. Set against this, it is really quite remarkable that the MGP partners were able to bring together the three Protected Area Authorities (PAAs) in 1991 and reach agreement on a conservation programme involving all three countries with an evolving framework for regional collaboration. At this point in the report, we need to highlight this as critical to the IGCP transboundary story. Learning lessons from the IGCP experience is in large part about trying to understand this achievement. In the remaining sections of this chapter of the report we continue to describe IGCP's activities. In the chapter that follows we take a more analytical approach in order to get at that understanding.

IGCP's early activities largely involved supporting the three PAAs, providing basic equipment which was frequently looted due to conflict. During 1991-1994, IGCP's transboundary activities were largely confined to DRC and Rwanda, with bilateral meetings with representatives of the two PAAs and cross-border visits by field personnel. From November 1993 until the genocide of April 1994, there was a brief period of organising joint ORTPN-ICCN patrols with teams of around ten rangers spending about a week working and camping together. At that time, relations between Rwanda and Uganda were too poor to engage in these patrols. There was however limited cooperation between Congo and Uganda. For example, gorillas occasionally cross the border from Bwindi into the Sarambwe Forest Reserve, an event that has always caused great concern due to the lower level of protection in Sarambwe. When this occurred in 1993 IGCP were able to contact ICCN staff at Rumangabo who agreed to send a patrol to the area. In the later 1990s there were informal meetings between PAAs for QENP and PNVi, especially over the use of lake fisheries, but these did not always result in cooperation.

“The joint patrols worked very well for six months or so before the genocide. They were really quite remarkable – so much more effective, partly because each team wanted to show off to the others how good they were. There was real brotherhood in these events. I saw Congolese wearing Rwandan shirts and vice versa – they exchanged shirts like football players.” José Kalpers, Programme Manager African Parks Network and former IGCP Coordinator from 1991.

“The regional meetings were a foundation for building trust and collegiality. Friendships formed and wardens were able to deal with problems that otherwise might have involved the police. There were many examples of small conflicts being resolved when they were still small. For example cows grazing on the wrong side of the boundaries had been exactly the kind of thing that had previously escalated into major incidents. Regional meetings had a deep impact” Annette Lanjouw, Director Great Apes Program, Arcus Foundation and former Director of IGCP

After the genocide, collaboration between Rwanda and DRC became more difficult as governments clashed over the refugee crisis and as DRC itself fell into civil war. By early 1997, with the fall of Mobutu, a rather better climate for cooperation had arisen (Kalpers, 2001) and the following became the principle IGCP facilitated activities:-

- › First and foremost, IGCP had national programmes in each country.
- › Communication and information sharing. PAA staff increasingly shared information with counterparts in neighbouring countries, including information on gorilla movements, poaching, and monitoring data. In the early years, when good relations between Rwanda and Congo were sealed by the friendship between Mobutu and Habyarimana, IGCP managed to negotiate a license for radio communication between Ruhengeri and Rumangabo, enabling daily communication. Whilst this has not been possible since the genocide, the use of cell phones and email has helped maintain and strengthen communication. This has made it increasingly possible to manage cooperatively potential conflict situations such as where gorilla groups crossed borders.
- › Bilateral meetings between Rwanda and DRC began in 1992, then later between DRC and Uganda, and finally regional meetings between the three countries started in 1995. These quarterly regional meetings took place involving staff from headquarters and field offices from the three PAAs, organised, funded and facilitated by IGCP. As is still the case today, each meeting lasts two days and includes a focus on a particular theme, involving training and discussion. Themes have included, for example, Ranger Based Monitoring, enterprise development, law enforcement, ecotourism, disease transmission and peace parks.
- › Regional training programmes were developed, reflecting IGCP's prioritisation of PAA capacity building both as a basis for national and regional management. Programmes have included community conservation, Ranger Based Monitoring, gorilla tourism, foreign languages, and anti-poaching (Lanjouw *et al.*, 2001).

- Ranger Based Monitoring (RBM) was developed in PNVi DRC in 1997 and 'regionalised' through introduction to Rwanda and Uganda in 1998/99.
- Joint activities, including joint and then co-ordinated patrols, gorilla censuses, and anti-poaching activities. Joint patrols were restarted after the genocide and by 2006 there had even been tri-national patrols. However, security forces raised concerns about crossing borders, particularly carrying arms, and co-ordinated patrols replaced joint patrols. Co-ordinated patrols between ICCN and ORTPN had been on hold since 2007 but began again in January 2009; they also continue between ORTPN and UWA.
- Helping with equipment, including provision of GPS units, binoculars and digital cameras.
- Work with armed forces and other partners to improve the security of park staff and visitors.
- Sharing experiences of adopting community conservation interventions.

"TBNRM has offered a chance for the three PAAs to learn from each other. For example, UWA's experience of working with local communities has provided an example to ORTPN and ICCN, helping them to decide that building community benefits is the right way to progress". Eugène Rutagarama, Director of IGCP.

3.3. Formalisation and Institutionalisation

UWA, ICCN and ORTPN have made considerable progress through informal and field level co-operation. Nonetheless, it became widely felt that the involvement of governments in more formal arrangements was a necessary and viable progression, albeit with certain risks. In February 2001, the MacArthur Foundation funded a meeting of PAAs and NGOs to initiate a process of strategic planning for the entire Albertine Rift. The Albertine Rift Conservation Society (ARCOS) was selected to facilitate the planning process, together with a steering committee consisting of the Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International (DFGFI), Institute for Tropical Forest Conservation (ITFC), Makerere University Institute of Environment and Natural Resources (MUIENR), Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), IGCP and WWF. The MacArthur process was followed up with scientific assessment work and with **A Framework for Conservation in the Albertine Rift 2004-2030** which established a set of objectives for the AR and six landscapes (named 'planning units') around which planning partnerships would develop (Figure 1). Planning Unit 2 of this Framework is the Greater Virunga Landscape.




Figure 1: The 6 Planning Units contained in the 2004-30 Framework for Conservation in the Albertine Rift.

In January 2004, a smaller scale Transboundary process was launched through a meeting in Goma facilitated by IGCP and attended by the Executive Directors of ORTPN, ICCN and UWA. This culminated in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the **Central Albertine Rift Protected Area Network**. As defined within this new process, the Central Albertine Rift included the six national parks that had made up Unit 2 in the MacArthur/ARCOS process, but not the forest and wildlife reserves. Perhaps for this reason, some people see the IGCP process as sitting within the 2004-2030 Framework whilst others see it as an alternative. Key elements of the MoU were an agreement to develop a Transfrontier Strategic Plan, an undertaking to co-ordinate management of the parks, and to establish the Transfrontier Core Secretariat (TCS), with two members from each of the PAAs and from IGCP. In October 2005, this MoU was further strengthened by the **Tripartite Declaration of Goma**, which stressed that efforts would be made to move towards formal agreement for transboundary management and to 'lobby' respective governments for financial commitment to implement the strategic plan. This declaration was signed by state ministers in charge of natural resource management from the three countries. In May 2006, directors of the three PAAs signed off on a **Ten Year Transboundary Strategic Plan** produced by the TCS with support from IGCP. At the same time, the directors also signed a **Trilateral MoU on the Collaborative Monitoring of and Sharing Revenues from Transfrontier Tourism Gorilla Groups**.

Summary of the 10 year Strategic Plan

The plan establishes an institutional structure for implementation of TBNRM. This involves:

Transboundary Inter-Ministerial Council.

Representatives from the three relevant government ministries.

The Transboundary Core Secretariat (TCS).

The Executive Director and a Technical Associate from each PAA.

The Transboundary Executive Secretariat (TES).

This was not named as such in the Strategic Plan, but was referred to as a full time secretariat. Membership is three full time staff, one from each country.

Four Regional Technical Committees:

Research, Tourism, Community Conservation and Enterprise, Security and Law Enforcement. Membership consists of representatives from the three PAAs, plus six other members.

The plan is intended to work towards the objective of "Sustainable conservation of the CAR biodiversity for long-term socio-economic development through strategic transboundary collaborative management". In building towards this objective, the plan identifies eight 'key result areas':

1. Enabling Environment. Policies and Laws
2. Landscape Management.
3. Effective Management Capacity
4. Collaboration
5. Law Enforcement
6. Education and Awareness
7. Economic Development
8. Financial Sustainability

In this chapter, we have summarised the context and development of TBNRM in the Central Albertine Rift. In the next chapter, we analyse this experience in more depth, identifying lessons for IGCP and for the wider conservation community.

4. ANALYSIS AND LESSONS

4.1. An NGO-State Model of TBNRM?

At the beginning, IGCP partners did not conceive of a particular model for TBNRM – at least not in the sense of identifying and choosing between possible alternatives. Those involved in the early years refer to the very heavy constraints under which they operated, and which dictated the approaches taken. For example, more formal international agreement might have been a suitable starting point for some Southern African peace parks but was not an option in the Great Lakes region. Despite a reported lack of options, a distinctive (perhaps unique) model of TBNRM evolved. We call this model an NGO-State model. At the outset, we simply define this as model of TBNRM with two basic features: first, that the process is initially led by an NGO (or NGOs), and second, that state agencies become the most important planning and implementation partners.

We propose that the NGO-State model is critical to understanding the successful development of TBNRM in a region experiencing conflict. We examine this proposal in more detail by looking at four elements of the evolution of TBNRM in the region:-

1. *Leadership and partnership*: in particular, we reflect on the lessons to be learned from NGO leadership.
2. *Phases*: we employ this term to refer to the scales at which co-operation is active and the type of mechanism in place for co-ordinating this co-operation. Scales and co-ordination change over time and therefore the different ‘phases’ represent stages in the maturity of TBNRM. We tentatively suggest that these phases can be looked at alongside observed trends in the lifecycle of NGOs.
3. *Institutionalisation*: this is really one aspect of the co-ordination of collaboration, but its importance merits a separate section. It raises important questions about the fit between the administrative structures and the tasks at hand.
4. *Funding*: funding determines the kind of activities, the scale and structures that can be developed, as well as their sustainability. Here too, there are questions about ‘fit’, given that donor agendas and time-frames are unlikely to be optimal for all aspects of TBNRM.

4.1.1. Leadership and Partnerships

“It is a striking NGO-PAA partnership – striking and effective. It is both a realistic and an exciting model, especially for working with governments whose wider relations have been so difficult”. Giuseppe Daconto, CARE International, Kigali

Whilst it is common for NGOs to play some role in TBNRM, it is less usual for this role to be one of enduring leadership. Great Limpopo, the Nile Basin Initiative and other well known examples either began with government leadership or quickly moved towards it. Those interviewed provide three main sets of reasons for why this model has been effective:

- a) The context of the situation,
- b) The style of leadership, and
- c) The characteristics of IGCP.

With regards to the situation, it is recognised that the severe and prolonged instability in the region has required a facilitator which strives (with varying degrees of success) to be seen as neutral and to serve as a catalyst for dialogue and collaboration between the three PAAs and their supporting ministries. In other words, an NGO-State model is an appropriate ‘conflict model’ for TBNRM. With regards leadership style, previous Lessons Learned have reported in detail about IGCP’s mandate to work intimately with PAAs, helping to build their capacity and achieving equitable partnerships. We will not repeat the details of this approach here, but do stress that it is this strategy that underpins IGCP’s view of itself as a facilitator as much as a driver of TBNRM. With regards the characteristics of IGCP, we should remind ourselves that technically IGCP is not an NGO but a programme that is a product of partnership; this background has influenced IGCP’s cultural orientation towards working in partnerships. It is also noteworthy that IGCP has three very significant ‘parents’, providing it with a level of organisational credibility from its inception. Perhaps more importantly, these parents have worked together very well, reportedly with a level of trust and transparency that is not altogether typical of high level conservation coalitions.

The lesson here is that, given a context of inter-state conflict, an NGO-State model of TBNRM can be effective in the short-term through commitment to equitable partnership. We are careful to emphasise

that this model may only be suitable in the short-term as there is now an important question about how that model needs to evolve to reflect the improving relations between the three countries, the more balanced capacity across the three PAAs, and the wider evolution of the TBNRM model towards more formal institutions. For example, when reviewing the initial funding proposal for the DGIS project, the Dutch Embassy engaged IGCP in critical debate about the appropriate role for an NGO, a subject which continues to be debated intensely both within IGCP and between partners. The general consensus is that IGCP's role will be increasingly one of supportive backstopping, and less that of directorship or even facilitator. This change in role has been in some measure driven by donor prescriptions but more importantly, and most satisfying, is the demand from the PAAs themselves, and most recently from the new Greater Virunga Transboundary Executive Secretariat (GV-TES) which is in the process of developing the self-confidence to operate directly through the PAAs. How far and how quickly such confidence and capacity develops, remains to be seen, and there are certainly obstacles to this. Firstly, working through IGCP remains an easier option for many transboundary activities, simply because IGCP has the experience and capacity. Thus, for example, it remains relatively easy for wardens to organise joint patrols through IGCP, difficult to do this directly through PAAs, and probably inappropriate to do this through the GV-TES. So there are interesting debates still to take place about the pace and extent of the transition to a secretariat that works exclusively with PAA line management.

A minority of respondents felt it would be a mistake for IGCP to fully hand over leadership, believing that if PAAs were left to manage the secretariat, political interference would weaken its neutrality and effectiveness. Whilst there is inevitably some nervousness about this important transition, we find the arguments in favour of IGCP continuing its strategy to empower the PAAs, and to support the institutionalisation of the GV-TES to be persuasive. Vitaly, these strategies help to ensure PAA ownership of, and commitment to the transboundary process and to conservation in general. The removal of IGCP dominance in the process also makes it much easier for the secretariat to bring other players on board which is necessary for the effectiveness and sustainability of the collaboration. Clearly IGCP will maintain old roles and develop new roles as this transition evolves. As stated above, there are things that IGCP currently does more efficiently than other partners, such as facilitating joint patrols. IGCP will no doubt maintain some such transboundary functions, working under the mandate of PAAs. At the same time, once distanced from running of the secretariat, IGCP will be more able to advocate for its conservation objectives through the secretariat.

4.1.2. Phases

“TBNRM is not really a model for bottom up governance. It is more a catalyst for momentum around the park”, Anecto Kayitare, former Regional Transboundary Officer, IGCP, Kigali.

TBNRM is fundamentally about creating new scales of governance and managing links between scales. Transboundary co-operation can be active at a number of levels. At the local level, for example, there might be cooperation between park rangers to deal with problems arising from livestock grazing in border areas. Moving up a level, park level cooperation over organised trafficking of wildlife might operate through cooperation between chief wardens and district police chiefs. To collaborate over wildlife monitoring and census work might require moving up another level, to agreement between national PAAs, whilst co-ordination of tourism policies might require the involvement of ministers of state and perhaps regional forum such as the East African Development Community. The experience in the Virunga-Bwindi region reveals that the level or scale at which TBNRM activities is closely related to the institutional design and the means of co-ordination that is appropriate. For example, local level cooperation can be ad hoc and informally co-ordinated, whilst inter-ministerial cooperation normally requires more formal co-ordination through some form of signed agreement. In relation to TBNRM in the Central Albertine Rift, we identify three phases of TBNRM.



Figure 2: Three Phases of collaboration in the Greater Virunga Transboundary Protected Area Network

Phase 1 began at ground level with informal co-ordination, involving field activities of the three PAAs. As described above, this approach to TBNRM was adopted at a time when more formal, ministerial level cooperation was not possible.

“We have been developing transboundary collaboration for more than ten years and without politicians being involved it did work. It was important for UWA, ICCN and ORTPN to do this - it was important to them despite all the wars.” Norbert Mushenzi, Deputy Director, ICCN, Rumangabo.

Phase 1 has involved some concrete achievements that have undoubtedly contributed to conservation effectiveness. These include:

- › Joint and then co-ordinated patrols
- › Regional meetings
- › Collaborations to fight against poaching and trafficking
- › Arrangements for helping injured and orphaned gorillas
- › Data sharing
- › Harmonised monitoring through RBM
- › Harmonised gorilla tourism protocol
- › Collaborative wildlife censuses
- › Learning and dissemination of community conservation practices
- › Revenue sharing with communities (Uganda and Rwanda),
- › Conservation enterprise program
- › Activities to reduce human-wildlife conflict
- › Work with armies and police forces to improve security for park staff and visitors.

“If it had not happened, the fate of the gorillas in the Southern Sector would have been totally different. I am sure of that.” Jean-Pierre d’Huart, Conservation Consultancy Services, Belgium

Phase 1 in the Virungas can be viewed as:-

- a) The only way TBNRM could have been attempted during the 1990s and early 2000s,
- b) A success in its own right,
- c) Having reached its limits, and
- d) A necessary foundation for moving on to Phase 2 activities.

In terms of reaching its limits, it has become clear that some desirable collaborative actions can be better facilitated through higher level involvement. Some of the things that require high level negotiation are quite simple improvements to the effectiveness of field operations such as joint (as opposed to co-ordinated) ranger patrols and shared radio frequencies. But there are also more complex matters requiring government commitment, such as the proposed extension of the Virunga World Heritage Site. Participants have noticed more and more ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ initiatives that

would benefit from higher level political intervention and such observations have driven the evolution of TBNRM.

“When it comes to security problems, the big lesson is to implicate governments in collaboration. IGCP’s challenge is to facilitate improving the involvement of each country”, Charles Nsabimana, Law Enforcement Warden, ORTPN VNP.

“Gaining political will is crucial. If you have a government that is really behind you, saying that poaching must be stopped, then it will happen. It is about national polity – if the government is not involved then the people will decide. In Rwanda, it became relatively easy for me to arrest someone because the army was behind me and the police were behind me – because they know that the president supports this.” Justin Rurangirwa, former Chief Park Warden, VNP,

In DRC, by contrast, it has emphatically not been easy for ICCN to uphold park rules, and the Congolese army has not always been supportive.

Phase 2 refers to the move towards formal agreements at a ministerial level. Whilst the first landmark of success was the signing of the 2004 tripartite MoU, it is vital to understand that it had taken 13 years to get to that point. We should also note that Phase 2 does not describe a move away from Phase 1 activities, but rather an additional set of relations and partners that broadens the scope of TBNRM, hopefully unlocking the potential for deeper cooperation at all levels. The two levels of operation are designed to be compatible and even synergistic, in the sense that high level and formal collaboration should protect the successful ground level activities. On the other hand IGCP and partners recognise that there is also a danger that formalisation can lead to loss of control at lower levels. For example, it was mentioned that it has become very complex to organise co-ordinated patrols now that you cannot simply work on a warden-to-warden basis across parks. There are also considerable financial costs arising from Phase 2 administrative structures, not least the three full time executives who manage the secretariat. So far, this has not subtracted from funds available from field level operations, because IGCP has been able to raise additional funds to pay for these costs, but this is something to monitor. The recent (February 2009) ministerial agreement that makes the secretariat a legal entity means that the GV-TES can itself work to secure funding for core and other costs.

Phase 3 remains hypothetical although it very much exists in the imaginations of key partners in the Greater Virunga area. It refers to progression from cooperation and co-ordination over separate, contiguous parks, to the creation of an integrated Transfrontier Protected Area with unitary management authority. This would require agreement at presidential level. Whilst this remains some way off, it is viewed as both desirable and realistic in the longer term by many of those interviewed.

There are two points to make about this pyramid of Transboundary activities (Figure 2). In other contexts, especially under more peaceful conditions, it has been possible to begin with Phase 2 or even Phase 3 activities, although TBNRM is ultimately hollow if it does not eventually reach down to operational levels. Secondly, looked at as a progression from bottom to top, each new phase expands the range of activities and does not replace those of the previous stage.

Whilst an investigation of NGO life-cycles is beyond the scope of the present study, it is tempting to suggest a relationship between the evolution of TBNRM and the evolution of IGCP: in particular, both have grown and both have become more formally structured. Previous studies of NGOs have tried to identify generic stages of NGO life, such as Avina (1993) who suggested a four stage life-cycle of start-up, expansion, consolidation and closeout. Others have related organisational stages to types of leadership and institutionalisation: at the foundational stages of NGO life there tends to be heavy reliance on charismatic leadership and relationships tend to be personal and informal. During expansion, partnerships become more complex and staff become more expert and specialised, leading to the need for more formal structures (Siddiqui, 2000).

4.1.3. Institutionalisation

It has become felt that Phase 1 approaches to TBNRM have suffered from the reliance on personal relationships between individuals and that more formal structures are needed. For example, when a chief warden changes, there is a feeling that it takes significant time and effort just to regain the level of trust and cooperation achieved prior to the change.

“Institutions are the key to TBNRM, especially government ones. They are more stable than individuals who move away and more stable than NGOs who depend on short-term funds.” Arthur Mugisha, IGCP Programme Manager, Kigali.

There are two key aspects of what we here term 'institutionalisation'. The first refers to the organisational structure and the second, the legislative structure. The organisational structure is centred upon the Greater Virunga Transboundary Executive Secretariat (GV-TES) which came into existence in February 2008 and which gained a legal personality a year later. A permanent and independent secretariat was selected, with one full time staff member from each country, and a permanent office in Kigali. There was some consideration of alternatives to this model, including the use of staff seconded from the three PAAs, and hosted by each PAA in rotation. This is a model that was initially used in Great Limpopo. However, it was felt that a permanent and autonomous secretariat could more easily be perceived as neutral, even given the caveat that it would have to be physically situated in one place.

The creation of an international secretariat has the potential to resolve some of the problems associated with reliance on individual relations. Organisations can themselves develop memories, relations and norms, and these form part of a dynamic that is bigger than any component individual. On the other hand, the creation of an international institution provides no guarantees of improved cooperation or management and the effectiveness is likely to depend on whether the design of the institution fits the purpose and the context (Dombrowsky, 2008). The institutional design of the GV-TES will ultimately be measured by its effectiveness over a long period. The early signs are widely viewed positively, with a few issues that will require monitoring. Perhaps the key concern is that the orientation of the TES is currently determined by the project that provides its funding. This has a number of implications for its sustainability, for IGCP's relationship with it, and for its work plan. With regards the work plan, a tension between the TES role as project implementer and its wider role as the co-ordinator of transboundary collaboration has just begun to emerge and will be one of the delicate challenges to be negotiated in the coming months and years. The difficulty is that the TES is a small team with a large, 4 million Euro project to deliver on. That project does not only require delivery on process-oriented objectives related to developing TES capacity, such as securing its own legal status and its own long term funding arrangements, but also delivery on substantive operational outputs including expansion of park-community revenue sharing schemes. What remains to be determined, is how the TES staff can fulfil their role as project implementation team whilst also maintaining the space to think and act more strategically for the planning of TBNRM across the Greater Virungas and indeed across the Central Albertine Rift and beyond. It is clear that one of the strategies for fulfilling these roles will be the continued and growing partnership with a range of highly experienced partners operating within the Central Albertine Rift landscape.

The second aspect of institutionalisation worth mentioning here is the type of agreement needed to operationalise the activities of the secretariat, and the legal status of the secretariat itself. The current MoU and Tripartite Declaration offer non-binding commitments to strive towards collaboration, but there is a desire for more robust agreement. During the December 2008 meeting of the secretariat, three principle options were considered:-

1. A negotiated signed treaty creating the GV-TES. This would be negotiated at presidential level (although Uganda's constitution does allow for delegation). This is the deepest level of commitment as its ratification would result in binding legal agreement to implement the content of the treaty. Such treaties have been employed elsewhere, for example to create the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park.
2. A less substantive treaty, providing the GV-TES with a legal personality but committing countries only to co-operation and not to a set of binding actions. The Nile Basin Initiative is an example of a real, functional agreement that nonetheless lacks formal treaty that determines use of the Nile.
3. Establish the GV-TES as an NGO. This was not seriously considered as the secretariat would then lack state authority.

Whilst option 1 was considered the most desirable, consensus was easily reached to go for option 2 as an immediate step. This was largely due to the prevailing political situation in which it would be unrealistic to get Presidents Kabila, Kagame and Museveni to meet to negotiate park management. It was also clear that option 2 does not preclude a later attempt to negotiate a substantive treaty.

Whilst the political situation may not currently favour a treaty, it is not the only issue that will eventually need to be resolved. One issue is that Uganda has developed a much stronger legal framework for environmental management and it will be hard for DRC and Rwanda to operate to a harmonised standard. Uganda's 1991 National Environmental Action Plan and the 2004 Environmental Management Policy provide the kind of frameworks that cannot be reproduced overnight in other countries. A broader issue relating to developing a binding treaty is finding the right balance between the constraints of legally bound collective action and the ability of nations to respond to their own

needs. For the Nile Basin Initiative, for example, some consider that a treaty might reduce the ability of nations to develop decisive mechanisms for adapting to climate change.

4.1.4. Funding

The move from Phase 1 to Phase 2 has involved the establishment of a secretariat with considerable core costs. This has a number of implications.

- First, as mentioned, it required donor funding and therefore tied the GV-TES to delivering on a four year project in parallel with its wider commitment to a ten year plan across a bigger geographical area.
- Second, the shift creates wider opportunities for leveraging funds, for example DRC has approached donors such as the European Union's National Indicative Programme and the French GEF programme.
- Thirdly, fund-raising might be easier for work in mountain gorilla habitats, raising the issue of how funds are distributed within the Central Albertine Rift, especially if further progress is made towards integration within a single management structure.
- Fourthly, and a more immediate agenda item, the GV-TES is seeking a mechanism for funding core costs beyond the Dutch project period.

Indeed, the Dutch project requires a mechanism to be identified during the second (current) reporting period, based on a commitment from the PAAs to fund it themselves. During the December 2008 meeting, PAA representatives expressed good intentions towards such funding although it should be recognised that finding funds is not easy given that budgets are tight and PAAs are expected to be largely self-funding.

4.2. Cooperation and Conflict

In academic parlance, institutions refer not so much to organisations as to the 'rules of the game' - the formal and informal rules that determine how actors can and should behave. Thus, cultural taboos against killing and eating gorillas are institutions, as are the judicial laws that forbid this. In the process of this study, we have learned that this aspect of institutionalisation is just as important as organisational structure, because, depending on the nature of rules, different actors can be encouraged either to co-operate or compete. As was detailed earlier, inappropriate rules of the game can lead to competitive behaviour that result in 'tragic' environmental outcomes for all parties. In this section, we offer two main explanations for the successful growth of co-operation. The first considers more structural explanations for co-operation (and conflict), including rules of the game and the exercise of power. The second is about the importance of relationships between both individuals and organisations.

4.2.1. Structuring the game

In areas with a recent history of violent conflict, theory suggests that parks in border areas might best be committed as neutral buffer zones without shared activities. The premise for this is that any shared activity (such as tourism revenue sharing) presents an intolerable potential to trigger conflicts. For example, the demilitarised zone between North and South Korea remains vacant and is considered to have made a lasting contribution to peace because there are no activities there (Lejano, 2006). However, there are cases in which the risk of creating hostility is tolerated in lieu of the greater potential reward to be gained from creating an area of active cooperation, such as the case of the Red Sea Marine Peace Park between Jordan and Israel (Lejano, 2006) and the proposed peace park at the Golan Heights between Syria and Israel. There is a large body of research that investigates the conditions under which stakeholders successfully cooperate to manage environmental resources. Here we consider four such conditions: communication, mutuality, rules and ownership.

a) Communication.

One of the lessons from the 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin, 1968) is that the likelihood of ruinous non-cooperative behaviour is increased by an inability to communicate and an absence of trust. Through the well known Prisoners' Dilemma game, for example, theorists show that two prisoners confined in individual cells and unable to communicate, make decisions that appear rational to each alone, but when combined, become poor. It is perhaps not surprising then that IGCP's work to bring

about TB communication, through regional meetings, and more recently through the TCS and TES meetings, is widely believed to have been critical.

b) Mutuality.

Another lesson is that stakeholders are unlikely to invest heavily in protection of a resource when the benefits of this effort will fall to others. IGCP has supported the introduction of mechanisms for distributing the benefits from tourism and this has been an important step towards structuring 'the game' in ways that ensure that all players believe that they will be beneficiaries of conservation behaviour. Firstly, there are mechanisms for Revenue Sharing within individual countries (Uganda and Rwanda), whereby revenue from park-based tourism is shared with local communities. Secondly, and of most relevance to TBNRM, IGCP facilitated the signing in 2006 of the 'Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding on the Collaborative Monitoring of and Sharing Revenues from Transfrontier Tourism Gorilla Groups' which allows for sharing of revenue between countries, where groups of gorillas habituated in one country have crossed over into a neighbouring country. This latter scheme is considered an important component of TBNRM in the Virunga landscape:

"Due to the gorilla revenue sharing agreement, all sides have an interest in gorilla safety. They used to be suspicious when habituated gorillas crossed boundaries, for example thinking that the Rwandans had used sugar canes to entice the Nyakagezi group across from Uganda." James Byamukama, IGCP Programme Officer, Kabale

"50% sharing of gorilla revenue can create a lot of peace!" John Makombo, UWA Deputy Director, Kampala.

Such attempts to assure mutual benefit from TBNRM stands in contrast to the concerns about asymmetrical benefits in Limpopo where South Africa is perceived to benefit most from the transboundary tourism package (Wolmer, 2003).

c) Rules.

Consistent and well defined rules are seen as essential pre-requisite for collective action. Again, revenue sharing is an example, but so too is the harmonisation of the standards for tourism. The tripartite agreement is itself an important step towards creating a formal institutional context that favours cooperation and the ongoing project to incorporate PNV and Mgahinga parks into the Virunga World Heritage Site will go further to establish harmonised commitment and rules.

d) Ownership. The structure of the current TES and TCS provides for co-ownership of the TBNRM process.

"It does not make sense for a PAA Director or Minister not to cooperate with the strategy - they would be killing their own baby." Tom Sengalama, Executive Secretary, GV-TES

"There is no question about our commitment to making this sustainable - it is our own creation." Moses Mapesa, Executive Director, UWA

Despite these important attempts to establish conditions favourable to collective action, we should note that valuable resources will continue to present possible causes for disagreement. This is not just about gorilla tourism, but other revenue from donors and from exploitation of charcoal, coltan, oil and other mineral resources. Issues that might require some debate include:

- Whilst gorillas provide a powerful basis for cooperation, there may in future be an issue about the extent to which gorilla habituation continues. Whilst over 70% of gorillas in the Virunga massif are now habituated, conservation groups are likely to resist such a high rate for Bwindi.
- Another issue raised by respondents was the wider issue of the distribution of any revenue generated directly through the secretariat. For example, if it were money for the Virunga Massif, would Uganda warrant an equal share despite the small size of Mgahinga?
- In the wider Central Albertine Rift, oil is viewed by some as a potential source of conflict, especially in the Lake Albert area between DRC and Uganda.

4.2.2. Relationships

“One day you start to market one another instead of making yourself look good by making others look bad” Kule Asa Musinguzi, Chief Conservation Warden, BMCA

Whilst an emphasis on institutional structures can help to explain the ability to reconcile material interests, especially over mountain gorilla conservation, it omits an important component that has been articulated by nearly everyone we have spoken with: the importance of relationships. It is clear that we need to go beyond explanations found of game theorists, based on an understanding of actors acting rationally and materially. It may be that transboundary parks work precisely where the behaviour of actors is driven not just by mutual self-interest but by the ways actors relate to each other and operate in union with each other (Lejano, 2006). The kind of relationships that might be important to TBNRM are those between parties at a range of scales, from individuals operating in the field, up to large state ministries.

IGCP's regional work since 1991 has served to create a platform for relationship building in two key ways. First, it has created the opportunity for engagement in a range of joint activities such as planning meetings and wildlife monitoring. Second, by reconfiguring the parks in people's imagination – from separate parks to an integrated landscape. This way of thinking, acting and talking about the Greater Virunga landscape creates a single focal point (a single conservation target) around which PAA staff can build shared professional identities. Theorists such as Lejano (2006) suggest that having such a basis for building a shared identity is an important aspect of relationship building. A simple way of thinking about this is that it provides an arena in which staff can perceive themselves as part of the same group, rather than members of different groups. The mountain gorilla is itself an important shared symbol that facilitates the forging of shared identities: an opportunity for individuals to define their identities as professionals seeking to protect this species.

When social psychologists refer to inter-group relations, they tend to ascribe conflict to situations in which people are perceived according to their group, rather than as individuals (Martin, 2005). Hence, where wardens see their international counterparts as 'Rwandans' 'Congolese' or 'Ugandans', rather than as unique individuals, or as committed conservation professionals, they are less likely to cooperate. Drawing further on this literature, we now seek to understand the achievements of transboundary work by considering one type of situation that is widely felt to deepen and entrench inter-group hostilities, and by contrast, a set of interventions that are widely felt to relieve them.

Relative Deprivation as a Barrier to Co-operation.

Conflicts can be entrenched by perceptions of 'relative deprivation' – the perception that your group is gaining less benefits, bearing more costs, or in some way being treated less well than the other groups. Even quite trivial differences can be perceived as important and hamper efforts at cooperation (Jackson and Smith, 1999). This is critical for IGCP and for the GV-TES who are acutely aware of the difficulties of achieving equality of benefits for DRC. There are a number of reasons why some stakeholders perceive DRC to get less from transboundary conservation than its partners:-

- There is no national Revenue Sharing scheme yet, for sharing tourism revenues with local communities;
- Many NGOs won't work there;
- Renewed fighting in October 2008 led some NGOs to withdraw their funding;
- The security situation makes it extremely difficult to sustain community conservation projects;
- There are few prospects for tourism development in the near future;
- The location of IGCP and the GV-TES in Rwanda;
- The nationality of IGCP leaders.

For its part, IGCP has worked hard to try to equalise benefits, ensuring that at least a fair share of core funds is allocated for DRC, but of course it cannot dictate the spending of its donors.

“We are trying to rise above political sentiments – to forget nationalities and think about professions. But people ultimately gravitate towards national identities. For example, with money from the Buffett Foundation we agreed to invest in tourism in DRC, but then due to security problems we took the money to Uganda. We could see that people in DRC were hurt and could feel it in relationships.” Arthur Mugisha, Programme Manager, IGCP

Shared Activities as a Stimulant to Co-operation

Conflicts can be alleviated through the use of well-tested strategies which include:

- a) Face to face contact to establish shared goals,
 - b) Cooperative activities in pursuit of these goals,
 - c) Equality of status during meetings,
 - d) Support from relevant authorities and/or an independent facilitator.
- (Hewstone and Greenland, 2000; Fiske, 2002).

When we look back at Phase 1 of TBNRM, we can see that the regional meetings, joint patrols and other shared activities fitted very precisely with these well established approaches for building inter-group co-operation.

“More structural things have also happened but these regional meetings were the roots: they had a deep impact”, Annette Lanjouw, Director, Arcus Foundation Great Apes Programme; former Director of IGCP.

“It has been about confidence building through continuous interaction. At times we thought that others were bad, but this changes when you have met them a few times”. Kule Asa Musinguzi, Chief Conservation Warden, BMCA.

“TB management is a good tool for bringing together the park – for having things to do together. We don’t think of them as from another country” Charles Nsabimana, Law Enforcement Warden, VNP

One key aspect of relationship building is IGCP’s own relationship with PAAs and other close partners. Relationships are built at multiple levels and, importantly, over long periods of time.

“We capitalise on what we have – history - even when there is fighting going on” Altor Musema, former IGCP Programme Officer, Goma

“The long duration of our work leads to credit. We maintain a presence and we build credit and draw on this when necessary” Thierry Bodson, Programme Coordinator, WWF, Goma.

Such credit does not always have immediate impacts, but it will often show through. For example, Eugene Rutagarama, the current IGCP director recalls attending a meeting in Naivasha, Kenya in 1999 to discuss the World Heritage Site, at a time when relations between Rwanda and DRC were poor. The presence of Eugene in this meeting was not accepted by his DRC colleagues and he had to leave, but later that evening ICCN colleagues came to his hotel and apologised because they knew that they were really on the same side. Relationships based on professional respect may suffer as a result of political events but they do not disappear overnight.

The significance of building historically deep relationships is well illustrated through comparison with the process for co-ordinating the 2004-2030 framework for the whole Albertine Rift. As mentioned earlier, the co-ordination role was given to ARCOS, and they have recently faced difficulties with reaching signed agreements that contrasts with the speed of progress with the Greater Virunga process. For example, recent attempts to get ORTPN to sign a data sharing agreement have so far failed, arguably because ARCOS don’t have the historically rooted relationships of trust with PAAs, and are therefore forced to seek formal agreements before they have established the kind of relationships that seem capable of cutting through bureaucratic sinkholes. Both IGCP and the GV-TES have structured their staffing to help with such relationships, for example it remains necessary to have IGCP staff representing each country, and to have a GV-TES with staff from each country. This is not just about having country expertise, but also a recognition of the need to avoid perceived bias and that it is sometimes useful to have a Ugandan to negotiate with Ugandans, and so on.

“Dealings between countries can be very difficult when they are fighting. One of IGCP’s strategies is to empower *local* staff who can manage these politics. It is easier for them to gain trust and easier for them to lobby – they can really say things how they are.” Augustin Basabose, IGCP Conservation Science Officer, Goma

Finally, we tend not to highlight leadership when looking for ‘lessons’ about conservation effectiveness. This is for the obvious reason that it is so hard a condition to replicate – it is not very useful to be told that ‘good leadership is important’. But nonetheless, consistent fairness and commitment in leadership plays an important role in achieving trust and co-operation, especially when political events threaten to undermine this.

4.3. Scale and Function of TBNRM

IGCP was formed to support the protection of mountain gorillas and their habitats. Regional activities were implemented because mountain gorillas are a transboundary species. In other words, IGCP defines the appropriate scale of observation and intervention by looking through the particular lens of its conservation target and, within limits, the threats facing that target. On the other hand, the PAAs and some of the other NGOs that IGCP works with have a rather different way of seeing and defining the conservation landscape that, for example, takes into account a wider range of species that rely upon transboundary conservation. Plumptre *et al.* (2008) lists the following as species that require a transboundary landscape in order to survive in the Central Albertine Rift: elephants, hippopotami, lions, leopards, hyenas, golden cats, chimpanzees, gorillas, giant forest hogs and topi.

As has been described, the MacArthur-ARCOS process developed a 30 year plan for the entire Albertine Rift. However, scaling up conservation governance involves increasing the number of nations (Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda), and the range of stakeholders, of land uses and tenure arrangements, and so on. In other words, governance of a complex mosaic landscape becomes extremely complicated. For practical purposes, the Albertine Rift was therefore divided into 6 management units, including the Central Albertine Rift which was defined as a conservation landscape made up of:-

- Virunga NP (DRC),
- Volcanoes NP (Rwanda),
- Mgahinga Gorilla NP (Uganda),
- Bwindi Impenetrable NP (Uganda),
- Queen Elizabeth NP (Uganda),
- Ruwenzori Mountains NP (Uganda),
- Semuliki NP (Uganda),
- Kibale NP (Uganda),
- Kasyoha-kitomi forest reserve (Uganda),
- Kalinzu forest reserve (Uganda),
- Kyambura wildlife reserve (Uganda),
- Kigezi wildlife reserve (Uganda).

In theory, there are now four transboundary governance scales that include IGCP's focus on mountain gorilla habitats:

- The smallest unit is IGCP's own regional programme focused on mountain gorillas (the first four parks on the above list)
- The Central Albertine Rift Transboundary Network as defined in the Ten Year Plan and co-ordinated by the Transboundary Core Secretariat and Executive Secretariat (the 8 National Parks on the above list) (Figure 3).
- The Central Albertine Rift unit as defined by the MacArthur-ARCOS process (all protected areas in the above list).
- The Albertine Rift as a single unit (the above plus five other planning units).

This rather complex nesting of governance arrangements raises two important issues that we turn to now.




Figure 3: The Central Albertine Rift Transboundary Protected Area Network. Source: Ten Year Transboundary Strategic Plan 2006-2016.

4.3.1. From Gorilla-scape to Landscape

The GV-TCS/TES officially operates across 8 national parks from Volcanoes National Park, Rwanda in the south to Semuliki National Park, Uganda in the north. However, the TES is funded under a donor project that focuses only on the three southernmost parks. We have already considered the difficulty for the TES to work on more strategic planning issues, including the co-ordination of activities across the Central Albertine Rift, whilst it is busy meeting legitimate project outcomes. It is probably also fair to say that, so long as the TES remained very close to IGCP, it would not have been pushed to look further North for partnership. Nevertheless there is a wide belief, especially in the northern sector, that

- a) North and south should become more integrated within this process and
- b) That the TES has now begun to facilitate this, for example through contact with the Wildlife Conservation Society.

WCS have been playing a co-ordinating role along the Uganda-DRC border areas and more recently with Sudan, and will be a crucial partner in any unification of transboundary governance across the Central Albertine Rift.

“Queen Elizabeth, Rwenzori etc all share borders. It would be a huge benefit to Uganda if we expanded transboundary management so that all these came together” Kule Asa Musinguzi, Chief Conservation Warden, BMCA

The decision to include only National Parks within the TES planning mandate may be prudent in the short term in light of our comments about the complexities of incorporating territories under different land uses, tenures and management regimes. In the longer term, however, this is likely to be reviewed in favour of a more pure 'landscape' approach. At the most basic level, it makes little sense

to say that a gorilla group that crosses from Bwindi into DRC has exited the landscape. WCS faces a similar issue with its work on fisheries on Lake Edward where it has been bringing together stakeholders to form conflict resolution committees. These have reportedly started to function effectively, seeking to uphold rules and denouncing those who corrupt those rules. Whilst WCS and its partners would like to extend the dialogue to incorporate actors across the border, this is more difficult where it is not a PA on the Ugandan side.

4.3.2. Beyond the Transboundary Protected Area?

“The century of working *inside* parks to conserve wildlife has ended. Conservationists have learned that to conserve wildlife and other valued biodiversity we must now work outside of parks and reserves in complex areas designed for economic development” (Wilkie, Adams and Redford, 2008, p. 3)

Whilst this is not intended as an obituary for conservation within parks, the arguments for working beyond park boundaries are well established and were even visible in the rise of community conservation in the 1980s. There are three principle arguments for thinking and operating beyond park gates, and beyond the ‘fortress’ model of conservation that these gates represent. The first and most familiar is that the PAs are too small for long term viability of some target species. The second is that there is unavoidable connectivity within landscapes and that resilience is a feature of social-ecological systems rather than something that can be achieved for isolated system components. The third point is related to this and became popularised through the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) which emphasised the value of ecosystem services. These are functional dynamics of ecosystems that are demonstrably beneficial to humans (Westman, 1977; Myers, 1997). We are beginning to learn how biodiversity contributes to these functional dynamics, providing an understanding of both the processes and the scales at which biodiversity conservation contributes to human well-being.

Figure 4 indicates the link between ecosystem services and human well-being. It also highlights that the drivers of ecosystem change, both the direct drivers and the indirect processes that underpin these, originate beyond park boundaries.




Figure 4: Ecosystems and Human Well-being (Adapted from Millennium Ecosystems Assessment, 2005).

“If you zoom in on the park, the question is conservation; if you zoom out, you are no longer talking about how you share some small revenues, but about the future of conservation in the long term scenario for the landscape. What is driving change in the landscape? It’s not just parks and reserves. What is the economic answer for the landscape? It won’t be just parks and tourism.” Giuseppe Daconto, CARE International

As this quote suggests, if a landscape perspective is to be genuinely engaged, it requires a radical change in the way that conservationists perceive their role in a bigger economic picture characterised by livelihood insecurities that will not be addressed even by the more community-oriented conservation interventions. These are quite profound and difficult points for conservationists to engage with. Some of the basic premises are beyond doubt: that conservation of targets often depends on whole landscapes, including agricultural areas around and between PAs; that threats to the park are driven by sometimes distant events and processes that impact on the choices that people have about how to interact with the parks; and that conservation will not itself provide economic solutions for landscapes. The creation of the GV-TES provides an opportunity for a broader-based partnership for the landscape and a way for IGCP to think and operate at this scale whilst also retaining its focus on a single species that is widely regarded as a source of strength.

At Great Limpopo, there are two geographies of scale: the first defines a transfrontier park, the second a much larger 'transfrontier conservation area' that covers a whole landscape, beyond park borders (Spenceley and Schoon, 2007). However, extending conservation beyond the park boundaries has proved extremely sensitive for those making a living there (Wolmer, 2003; Hughes, 2003; van Amerom and Buscher, 2005). Thus, whilst the technical arguments for addressing whole landscapes are persuasive, the consortium of partners working for the GV-TES would need to pay careful attention to the process and the nature of such expansion. In Limpopo, the perception is of conservation agencies expanding their own interests and overpowering other constituencies.

4.3.3. Scale and politics

Constructing a scale of governance is an inherently political act that requires careful negotiation. An example that underlines this point was the decision about who would co-ordinate the larger process of Transboundary management for the Albertine Rift. In some ways, IGCP or WCS would have been more obvious candidates for this due to their history with regional conservation, their established relationships of trust with PAAs and their proven capacity. And yet it was readily agreed that ARCOS would take on the role, despite more limited history and capacity. Part of the resistance to IGCP taking a lead came from other conservation NGOs. What is typically referred to as 'NGO politics' arose from concerns about IGCP exerting its influence beyond its Virunga heartland, which some would have perceived as a display of IGCP hegemony. Competition for funds may also underpin such concerns because whichever NGO can claim credit for leading such an initiative is likely to gain some fund-raising advantage. Seen in hindsight, this is a lesson in how politics can effect quite profound decisions that determine the direction and ultimately the success of TBNRM initiatives. However there was also understandable resistance within the IGCP partnership, for example from FFI, who envisaged that taking on this role would dilute IGCP's focus and effectiveness.

4.4. Environmental Peacemaking

Whilst some commentators remain rather skeptical of the peace and security potential of TBNRM (e.g. Wolmer, 2003), others consider that the institutional changes that are part of the process can genuinely contribute to a transformation from insecurity to peace (Ali, 2007; Hammill and Besancon, 2007; Lejano, 2006). As we have seen in this study, conflict and cooperation live side by side in the Albertine Rift, and there is no simple movement along a pathway from conflict to cooperation. In the first part of this section, we review the ways in which TBNRM has facilitated inter-state cooperation over conservation at the same time as those states have been in political dispute. In the second part, we ask whether this successful level of intervention has an impact on the prevailing security situation. In other words, is there a contribution to peacemaking?

4.4.1. Conflict and Conservation

IGCP's experience of supporting conservation during conflict and post-conflict situations has been reported in detail elsewhere (Lanjouw, 2003), as has the impact of conflict on conservation in the Virungas (Kalpers, 2001; Kalpers *et al.*, 2003; Glew and Hudson, 2007). We will not revise this literature here, but we will attempt to bring the story up to date by reflecting on IGCP's role in the North Kivu conflict since September 2007. In that month, the CNDP, under the rebel leader Laurent Nkunda, took control of the Mikeno sector of the PNVi. Whilst most of the rangers fled their posts, 16-20 remained in occupied territory. For political reasons, ICCN were unable to communicate and cooperate with these rangers, and therefore IGCP took the step of making contact, with consent from rebel leaders, and eventually supported the rangers with food rations and equipment. This situation

initially created some tensions between IGCP and ICCN which eased somewhat following a meeting in Goma in January 2008. In the overall picture, ICCN was left with no access to Mikeno and no direct communication with rangers who remained under Nkunda's occupation – clearly an intolerable position which raised grave fears about the safety of wildlife.

“The CNDP are not seriously co-operating over conservation as they won't respect ICCN or the remaining rangers that they are controlling. We have had no access to the sector since 2nd September 2007 and communication through IGCP is not enough for us”. Norbert Mushenzi, ICCN Deputy Director, PNVi South, Rumangabo.

In October 2008, the situation worsened once again, with the CNDP taking the area around Rumangabo, forcing the park headquarters to be abandoned. In late November, around 200 ICCN staff fled across the border into Uganda whilst others remained with their families in refugee camps. In the face of this fresh intensification of violence, IGCP decided to maintain contact with the CNDP and continued to support the rangers. At the same time, they brokered the opening of direct communications between ICCN and CNDP leaders. The IGCP Director also traveled to Rumangabo soon after ICCN had re-occupied the park headquarters, to help develop an emergency plan for supporting ICCN activities. Since then, there has been regular communication and in January 2009, ICCN and IGCP were able to arrange a survey of habituated gorillas in Mikeno sector, finding 81 gorillas in the sector (compared to a 2007 count of 72). The Congolese and Rwandan armies are undertaking joint operations against the FDLR (a Hutu rebel force and a principle enemy of the CNDP), have captured Laurent Nkunda, and there are glimmers of hope. Nonetheless the situation is extremely tense.

The vacuum of authority and the war economy have proved a great threat to the park. Whilst the survey confirms that the rebels have not harmed gorillas, conflict has seen a surge in poaching and trade in charcoal. Conflict and corruption associated with these park resources have also been linked to the execution of at least ten gorillas in July 2007, just prior to Nkunda occupying the area. One of the great current concerns is the looming fuel wood crisis, driven by the rapid population growth of Goma from 200,000 to 600,000 in the last decade, the demand from large refugee camps and from armies, and the continued illicit trade in charcoal domestically and to Rwanda. Eucalyptus plantations are in many cases exhausted and there is little alternative to wood and charcoal as a fuel. At the meeting of the GV-TCS on December 1st 2008, the Congolese delegation and IGCP presented the current situation to the secretariat who devoted part of the meeting to identifying collective actions to offer moral and material support to ICCN.

The key thing to consider here is IGCP's response to this crisis, set against its role as facilitator of TBNRM. It has been an effective action that emphasizes the unwavering focus on mountain gorilla monitoring and protection. And it has been a bold intervention because of the political tightrope it traversed. In a nutshell, many observers of the war see the CNDP as having the backing of Rwanda whilst the FDLR are supported by the Congolese army. Thus it can be characterized as a continued Tutsi-Hutu war that has spilled across the border into DRC, and as a war by proxy between Rwanda and DRC. IGCP is already perceived as being Rwandan-oriented due to its pre-1991 origins, its location and its leadership. It was therefore bold in the sense that it exposed itself to possible misinterpretation and smear campaigns by being so overtly linked to the CNDP. To have emerged from this situation with distinction, having resolved many (though inevitably not all) of the suspicions within ICCN, is a credit to IGCP's leadership.

One thing that enabled IGCP to facilitate conservation in rebel occupied territory was its NGO status. That may seem obvious, but it also raises two important and related questions:-

- First, given the current situation of conflict, can TBNRM operate without an NGO facilitating? Or put another way; is it too early for IGCP to consider scaling back its role?
- Second, if IGCP is to remain free to act boldly in the face of political crisis, will it have to distance itself in order to protect the TCS's perceived neutrality?

4.4.2. Contribution to Peacemaking

“I am often asked how co-operation over gorilla conservation can be used as an entry point to facilitate wider government discussion about peace” Katy Fawcett, Director, DFGF-I Karisoke Research Centre.

The fact that TBNRM is capable of getting officials from the 3 countries to sit down and talk to each other is a good thing, but those who participate in this are not the same people who sit down and make decisions about security. How then, if at all, can transboundary conservation contribute to

peacemaking? At local levels, we can point to specific examples of how conservation interventions and governance structures have resolved conflicts (e.g. over habituated gorillas crossing borders) or occasionally stimulated minor conflicts (e.g. a conflict over distribution of gorilla permits at Nkuringo). But here we are interested not in local conflicts, but in a war that, taken in its totality, has directly and indirectly claimed an estimated 5 million lives, and left countless more men, women and children bearing the mental scars of atrocities. Can conservation really touch those who believe they can profit from this catastrophe?

Whilst we can't measure the impact, there are two ways in which TBNRM may play a role in peacemaking. Firstly, whilst the war in North Kivu is not primarily a war over resources, it is certainly prolonged and intensified by the existence of lootable resources such as coltan and charcoal. Transboundary governance may help to structure and strengthen resource management in ways that render peace a more profitable option for governments. This can happen, for example, where tourism offers a good income.

“Gorilla tourism is at the heart of our tourism industry. We think that this will help to bring peace because governments will look to get rid of rebel groups that threaten that industry.” John Makombo, Deputy Director, UWA

In addition to contributing to economic conditions that favour peace, conservation might also carry its dynamic of transnational cooperation to more sensitive issues of state. As one respondent put it: if we get along well, it becomes a bit easier for our ‘parents’ to get along too.

“At the conference in April 2008, government ministers chaired small discussion groups and became so involved that they kept these going until 7pm on the first day. They then reported these discussions at cabinet level in their countries.” Therese Musabe, Deputy Executive Secretary, GV-TES

“Yes, of course, with time this can work. The pressure for this idea is building progressively and taking root. There has not yet been enough time to push this all the way, and now is not the right time. But the single fact that the strategic plan has been endorsed by 3 countries is a victory. Nothing can now stop eventual approaches to Kabila, Kagame and Museveni.” Jean-Pierre D’huart

5. Conclusion: IGCP’s role

The formal phase of TBNRM in the Central Albertine Rift is relatively young: the Transboundary Executive Secretariat is only a year old, and has only recently become a legal reality, achieving independence from IGCP. Nevertheless, as has been explained in detail, the process has roots and relationships are good. Whilst it was not easy to organise the most recent meeting in Kampala, it did take place despite the problems between DRC and Rwanda. And those involved in the process have a lot in common and enjoy working with each other: over a drink at the end of this meeting, the Rwandan and DRC delegates were laughing so hard at each other’s jokes, they had to mop the tears from their faces.

Over the past 18 years, TBNRM has made a tangible contribution to conservation by improving the effectiveness of everyday field activities such as monitoring, law enforcement, tourism management and community conservation. It is now set to work towards collective political support to ensure those victories are maintained in the face of potential threats. As that work progresses, IGCP will undoubtedly continue to play an important role although exactly what that role is, remains open to consideration. Critical to the decisions ahead will be the need to adapt to the evolving political circumstances in the region. TBNRM in a time of war will hopefully evolve into TBNRM at a time of peace. Such a transition in the security situation might provide the opportunity to move more decisively away from an NGO-State model of TBNRM which may have less of an advantage during peacetime. This would not involve the disappearance of NGOs, but a change of role, with IGCP likely becoming one amongst several NGOs working with the technical committees to deliver on the current and future strategic plans.

Security is one of the key contexts that will guide the pace and shape of the Core and Executive Secretariats, and IGCP’s relationship to them. Another is the collective appetite to extend the geographical territory of transboundary governance along three dimensions: extension to those northern parks already included in the Strategic Plan, extension to forest and wildlife reserves, and extension beyond protected area boundaries. This will partly be determined by the capacity for the GV-TES to devote time and other resources to such strategic planning activities, and this will in turn depend on emerging structures for funding and the new processes and models of implementation that develop alongside this.

Finally, the future of TBNRM will also be shaped by the prioritisation of its three principle objectives: conservation, peace and economic development. In a previous report we have looked at the relationship between TBNRM and community conservation. There are at least two tensions here, firstly between the desire to centralise decision making and the desire to empower local people, and second, between the prioritisation of conservation and the acknowledgement that local livelihoods are vital to conservation. The latter tension might be resolved through an eventual shift towards a more inclusive 'landscape' perspective. Such a perspective will introduce the rather awkward reality that conservation is unlikely by itself to ever lift more than a small minority of local people out of poverty.

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Annex: Persons Consulted

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- Buhanga**, Edgar, Senior Planning, Environmental Impact Assessment Coordinator, UWA, 1/12/08, Kampala, Uganda
- Byamukama**, James, IGCP Programme Officer Uganda, 9/10/08, Kabale, Uganda
- Cranfield**, Mike, Director MGVP, 6/10/08, Ruhengeri
- Daconto**, Giuseppe, CARE Regional Programme Coordinator, Enterprise, Environment and Equity in the Virunga Landscape, 12/10/08, Kigali
- d'Huart**, Jean-Pierre, Conservation Consultancy Services, 28/11/08, Beauvechain, Brussels, telephone interview
- Fawcett**, Katy, Director KRC, 6/10/2008, Ruhengeri
- Kabagumya**, Cecily, Conservation and Network Manager ARCOS, 10/10/08, Kampala, Uganda
- Kalpers**, José, Programme Director, African Parks Network, Nairobi, Telephone Interview
- Kayitare**, Anecto, IGCP Regional Transboundary Officer, 5/10/2008, Kigali
- Kinani**, Jean Felix, MGVP, 6/10/08, Ruhengeri
- Kujirakwinja**, Deo, Director, WCS Goma, 7/10/08, Goma, DRC
- Lanjouw**, Annette, Director Great Apes Programme, ARCUS Foundation, 17/12/08, Cambridge, telephone interview
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